Is there or is there not a distinction between what is called analytical and what is called continental philosophy? We’ve talked about this some, but the answers are so far, unsatisfying.
It is necessary to remove one objection to this inquiry before I begin. That is, that there is no continental/analytic distinction, or there isn’t one anymore. I’ll make a brief, imprecise argument against this here.
- When I’m talking to members of this symposium about the distinction, we seem to be referring to something similar and understood amongst ourselves.
- It is useful clarify what one means in a group of one’s peers.
- It is useful to us to discuss the distinction.
- A false distinction would be a waste of time to talk about.
- Therefore it is describing a real distinction.
However, that doesn’t mean that we are using the words ‘continental’ and ‘analytic’ well, so the conclusion of this clarificatory process could be that we should use different words. But with that out of the way, let’s begin. I’ll explain two senses which seem insufficient, and then provide a potential solution.
(1) The usual sense in which we seem to delineate the two is something along the following lines: Analytic thought is depth-oriented, whereas continental thought is breadth-oriented. This isn’t wrong, exactly, but it is unclear what is being said. Obviously a good analytic philosopher wants to incorporate his conclusions into some kind of broad philosophical system, and continental philosopher wants to know how specific points cooperate in his outlook. Additionally, the farther we move from the positivists and British or Hegelian idealists, the more this seems to break down. Yes, an analytic work can be overly concerned with absolute precision (e.g., maybe Gettier discussions in epistemology), but a contemporary continental work can be equally narrow on the issues with which it is concerned. Both have come to assume a prior, accepted framework in which their work is done.
(2)Another way we’ve described it discussion is that the difference is one of method. Philosophical investigation seems to have very tight rules for the analytic. Defining one’s terms clearly, for example, is absolutely necessary. Possibility, necessity, right, good, justification, and so on, all have specific meanings and must be used accurately for meaningful discourse to proceed. The continental, on the other hand, can seem flippant with words she uses. For example, Derrida: “Deconstruction, by definition, cannot be defined.” Obviously, this is some kind of a joke, or a word game, the analytic might say. However, at times the continental will speak paradoxically and meant to be taken very seriously. The analytic cannot abide this. So, the method seems to be different.
This is more accurate than (1), as I hope to explain in my concluding paragraph. However, there are at least three problems with this explanation. First, the “tight rules” of the analytic have not been well-defined, and there doesn’t seem much reason to try. Vague guidelines can be made (clarity, precision, involvedness, comprehensiveness) but this isn’t a real definition of the essence of analytic philosophy. It is more of a description of its accoutrements. Second, because the continental is essentially defined negatively, (as not-a-follower-of-the-analytic-rules) it is equally vague.
(3) Though (2) is not sufficient to explain the distinction, it does point us in the right direction. There is a sense in which we are talking about a method of philosophizing. However, philosophizing is not the same as composing philosophy, which seems to be where (2) goes wrong. Those guidelines of analytic philosophy seem to exist because they describe loosely the way analytic philosophy is composed. However, the way analytic philosophy is written is expressive of something more fundamental in analytic thought. (1), however also helps in constructing this analysis, because the difference in philosophical method seems to be a difference in the order of operations of the “schools”. My proposition, then, is this:
1. What we have meant by an analytic philosopher (as philosopher) is one who attempts to work from the objectively meaningful to the subjectively meaningful. Definitions are proposed, [objective] propositions accepted or rejected, and then connected together to form a “book” of propositions about what one believes about the world. Questions are first directed against individual propositions, and then (if at all) the systems of those propositions in general.
2. What we have meant by a continental philosopher (as philosopher) is one who attempts to work from the subjectively meaningful to the objectively meaningful. A structure (one could even say narrative structure) is proposed – Marxism, Hegelianism, deconstructionism, etc. This becomes then the subjective method by which one applies and appropriates propositions about the world. Questions are first directed against individual propositions, and then (if at all) the systems of those propositions in general.
Let’s take two small, quick examples:
- “Judging whether life is or is not worth living amount to answering the fundamental question of philosophy.” –Albert Camus
- “I will stay on this course until I know something certain, or, if nothing else, until I at least know for certain that nothing is certain… [G]reat things are to be hoped for if I succeed in finding one thing, however slight, that is certain and unshaken.” — Rene Descartes
I use Camus and Descartes because neither is really continental or analytic, historically speaking. Camus is concerned with valuation, Descartes with certainty. Descartes is the most obvious possible example: Mathematical logic (something objective), essentially, will dictate and put together a system of philosophy for oneself (subjective). His cogito ergo sum is metaphysical, and thus a justifiable starting point for philosophy.
Camus’s project is similar in some ways—he too is looking for a kind of certainty. However, this certainty is not whether something exists, exactly, but rather one is able to live, whether there is a way to orient oneself toward the world that will result in meaningful interaction. Indeed, for Camus, humanity must rebel against the cruel, empty “objective” world. (Dostoevsky’s classic and similar sentiment is noted below as a further example.)
1 and 2 above, I think, are what we have generally meant by the analytic/continental distinction. Whether or not we should retain those words to describe the distinction (or philosophers themselves) is a different matter altogether.
I wrote this rather quickly, and I’m a little ashamed of it, but I wanted to get it posted or I’d never do it. There are still some issues with my final solution, I think, and I’d like to hear your thoughts about it if you have the time. Let me know, at least if (A) this seems clear in general, and (B) if my proposed definition seems superior or inferior to the preceding definitions.
A Humanities Symposium 